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Yet, in a larger context, in which government officials 
defined peace in terms of international prosperity and 
viewed domestic prosperity as dependent in the long run 
upon the international economy, Americans were also ac-
cepting .short-run economic risks for long-run economic 
gains. It is in this framework that the Williams thesis 
merits closer examination for its judgment of the aims 
of interest groups in the postwar period • 
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.I. Introduction: The Truman Doctrine as an Anticipation of 
. the Marshall Plan. 
At least one of the phases of the Cold War, the Truman Doc-
trine - Marshall Plan period, seems to offer the student a frame-
work that is relatively easy to grasp, if only in a super-
ficial way. The instrumants of these actions, the political-military 
and the economic, are so neatly complenentary to each other that it 
looks as though events had conspired to structure the different 
needs and objectives of the foreign policy in·an intelligible way. 
Soon a!'ter the end of the Second \forld Warf the Un5.1.f-H1. St.ates 
was faced with a situation that was radically different from what 
had been experienced after the First World War. Once the balance 
among the European powers had been restored in 1918, the United 
States had been able to withdraw its military forces, confident that 
the scale was tipped in favor of orderly.conduct of international 
affairs. 
This retreat was not to be repeated after 1945. The Second 
World War had left the European count.erweight to communist expan-
sion in a state of devastation and despair so profound that it took 
several years before the destruction of Western Europe in its 
political, military, and economic aspects was fully realized in the 
. , 
United States. It turned out that whereas American power in 1917 and 
I 
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by design, had been taken over by the United States, was in itself 
a process of several stages. The Postdam Conference had shown that 
President Truman had not irrevocably accepted a communist domination 
of Eastern Europe; H~roshima had signified that whatever the charac-
ter of the American intentions, they we-re backed by a-military pot-:-
-
ential which even surpassed the economic and industrial prepender-
ance of American power. 
In th:i.s context, the Truman Doctrine stands out as an inte:r·lm 
climax of the American awareness of its new global role. In the 
spring of 1947, Communist, leftist, and anti-monarchial forces in 
Greece seemed to be able to overcome the. Greek government which had 
been backed by British military since the German withdrawal in 1944. 
The function Greece had been supposed to play in a pacified Europe. 
was at stake. To this came the Soviet pressure on Turkey, where the 
• • 
·claims to strategic control of the Straits of the Fardanelles had 
been renewed. The British domination of the Eastern Mediterranean 
seemed in jeopardy until President Truman on March.12, 1947, formally 
promised to take over the British obligations as he launched the 
Truman Doctrine. 
; However, the British failure in Greece was ea:rly understood as 
I 
q, 
. ·~ 
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lln indication which pointed to the general situaJion in Western 
" 
.Europe. From the early spring0 fl947, State Department planners had 
carried out research on the problems of European revival. On June 5, 
1g47~ Secretary of State, George Marshall, promised American action for 
curing the patient, along with the .efforts for a neutralization of 
symptoms. While the Truman Doctrine relied basically on immed~ate 
military support to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan employed 
economic means for a general recovery of Western Europe which would 
to help check the growth of comnunism. 
The degree .to which the Truman Doctrine anticipated the Marshall 
Plan was indicated in the speech of Marc~ 12, in which Truman told 
Congress that he "believed that our help should be primarily through 
economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability 
1 
and orderly political processes." Another of the basic assumptions, 
which served as a main argument in support of the Marshall Plan, 
was revealed in the conception of a "militant minority exploiting 
human want and misery, •.• @.nql able to create a political chaos which 
..• makes economic recovery impossible. 112 Furthermore, the close re-
lationship between the doctrine and the p1an is testified to by 
George Kennan, author of one of the planning papers which had a de-
cisive influence on the launching of the program of European recovery. 
The paper erided with a plea that an effort be made in connection with 
1Public· Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1947, (Wash-,. 
ington, D.C., 1962),""J?. 179, (hereaf~er Truman Papers: 1947). 
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d of a .6uropean recovery program, to correct "what seemed to the i ea 
t o be some of the main misinterpretationsthat had been created us 
in connection with the Truman Doctrine." 3 President Truman himself 
stated that the doctrine and the Marshall Plan "are two halves of 
walnut," an unavoidable cliche' in any consideration of this the same 
. 4 period. 
If, however, the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery 
Program (ERP) have to be regarded as a unit, the question arises of 
which is the pea and which is the shell of American foreign policy 
of this period. What is form and what is content, and what might be 
considered rhetorical devices ''to scare the hell out of the Anerican 
" 5 people ? Even if it is generally agreed upon that the doctrine was 
basically military, while the Marshall Plan was economic, the ques-
more conspicuous. What was primarily at stake? The democratic in-
stitutions of Greece and Turkey or the strategic and economic in-
terests in the ~astern part of the Mediterranean Sea? Was the pur-
pose to help the starving people in Western Europe survive? Was 
it to save them from subversive communist fore es? Or was it perhaps 
to secure stable Darkets for export and investment? Did the Americans 
offer their help in order to secure peace abroad or rather in order 
3 George 1''. Kerman, ~for:10irs, (I~cnr York, 1967), p. ~559. 
h 
'.) '-'.-.>·• 1° (' 1 ' , f]1 ' 
"', l'. ·,}old'.·-'."'L::, .• he Cruc~l :d 
1960, ( :<~ '~ \I - v• i.· iu ', l \ - -:-· -]-:-:·o·.--.. ·-- ·--
' ( I J J,, ' _; l; .. ) f }; 0 •• U o 
Aftt?r: 
-·-...... ----~-
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t social and economic upheaval at home? Should American in-to preven 
tervention be regarded as a crusade for peace or as a campaign for 
e~ce and export? In case these questions should be complementar.y comm ~ . 
to each other, the issue arises0 f how these different motives were tied 
1·n the ideology of political economy and in the relationship between up 
domestic and foreign policy. 
Put in this way, it is evident that any answer to the questions 
above will attempt to touch upon problems which are basic not only 
to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan but to the context in 
which these actions appeared as episodes: the outbreak of the Cold 
War. Perhaps even broader: the motivating forces and the basic as-
sumptions of American diplomacy in the age of postindustrial cor-
porate capitalism. 
ll· The "Healist" and the "Revisionist" Approach to the 
Marshall Plan 
The central importance of the Marshall Plan, for a proper under-
standing of the themes of the Cold War, has increasingly attracted 
attention. Two mainstreams of investigation can be outlined; to Gome 
degree,both cf them seem to correspond to different climates of 
opinion. 
Until the late fifties, the literature on: the ~farsh:::i 11 PJ_ c:i.:!: 1·!::.~ 
dominated by authors of the "academic-realist" school. With George 
F. Kennan and Hans Morgenthau as its most widely known spokesmen, 
this school relied on a concept of power politics as the proper basis 
for the conduct of foreign policy. This approach to contemporary 
political issues was an offshoot of a similar approach to history in 
general. 
With the recent experiences of Nazi Geroany in clear memory, the 
academic realists developed their theory of international relations 
on the assumption of an inherent aggresfJivenecs of states. The desire 
for maximation of power, which circur1scribed this conception of 
national int<.;rest, constituted a set of principles according to which 
it was pos~-;i ble to 
culculate act:Lons and reactions in foreir;n affairs. 
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. obstacle to a rational conduct of international politics was A main 
· the intrusion of public opinion into the decision making found in 
process. 
'A._: good deal of our trouble seems to have stemmed from the ex-
tent to which the executive has felt itself beholden to short 
term trends of public opinion in this country and from what 
we might call the erratic and subjective nature of public re-
action to foreign-policy questions.l 
The presence of public opinion in the formulation of foreign 
relations signified to the academic realists interference of an ir-
rational and highly incalculable factor which tended to break down 
the distinction between domestic and foreign policy, and hence, con-
fuse the game of competing interests which wa~3 best handled by 
trained experts who knew the proper rules. The involvement of the 
public had made the environment of states unstable and vacillating, 
because concep~s of individual law had been carried over into the 
international field and legalistic ideas had been associated with 
moralistic ones: "the assumption that state behavior is a fit sub-
ject for moral judgement." 2 
The intent behind this theory was twofold. First it was highly 
programmatic i.n its call for "professionalism" to substitute for the 
current "diplomacy of dillettantisrn". 3 Secondly, it constituted a 
critical approach to the history of American diplomacy. In the case 
1 
George :F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, (Chicago, 1951), p. 81. 
21 bid. p. 87. 
---
3Ib. 1 
-1:.S.· 1) • Ell. 
" 
~ ~~. 
· · · the Marshall 
of 
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Plan, both aspects converged. On the one hand, the 
' 
BRP was favored as an expression of liberal principles and pragmatic 
on the other hand, the Marshall Plan had been adopted for planning. 
reasons. As Morgenthau described the motivation for the the wrong 
plan: 
The issue of military and econooic assistance to Western Europe 
presented itself primarily not.as.a question of national ii:i-
terest, but as one of moral principle, of selfless generosity. 
Such aid was defended as a mandate from America's humanitarian 
past, it was opposed in terms of the unworthiness of the re-
cipients and of the sacrifices it imposed upon the giver.4 
Considered as an historical account, serious objections can be 
raised against this interpretation, as this paper hopes to point 
out. But also from a more theoretical point of view, this approach 
seems open to criticism. 
The assumption of the fundamental aggressiveness of nations, 
which must be deterred by the aggressiveness of other nations, appears 
to be a self-assuring rationale. Expectations of aggression tend in them-
~elves to promote responses, which might insure aggression, even 
where no offenses were intended from the onset. Hence, the prophecy 
fulfills itself .5 Secondly, the relationship between public opinion 
and foreign affairs wm> hardly as simple ·as assumed by the academic 
realists. While it remains true that a public outburst of emotion 
may at times endanGer short-range policies nnd jeopardize the 
4,i 
.t arrn J. JVlorgentho..u, In Defense of National Interest, (Hew York, 
1951), p. 122. 
" 
,,..,. ational system, scholars 
. intern 
- .Lt:: -
have pointed out that the Truman ad-
h. 
. . tration had effective means at its disposal with which to in-
1111n1s 
flu en Ce or manipulate public opinion. Furthermore, the influence of 
been 
the bureaucracy now seems to have significant to the point where 
governrr]ent agencies were able to plan and pursue policies of their 
own with only a minimum of interference from the president 01~ pub-
6 
lie opinion. 
With its emphasis on containment instead of crusade, on a ra-
tional conception of national interest instead of crusading fervor, 
the academic realism seems, in retrospect, in itself to signify one 
of the stages of the development of an autonomous bureaucracy within 
the order of the military-industrial complex. Although some were 
influential commentators, it is striking how many of the academic 
+i,,o ,..,;;;i;;i,,... 
l, ~.... ..... .. ........... , .. _ ·-<- -·- ,.,,,. or ~ppc~ 0chelon2 
the establishment of the agencies of official or semi-official foreign 
policy. On this background, the advocacy of professionalism and ex-
pertise suggests the development of a self-conscious status group. 
A characteristic that was common for the criticism of the lib-
eral realists was the unwillingness to question the basic assump-
tions behind the Cold War tension. Hepresentative in this respect 
lere Herbert Feis' contemporary writings. Like Kennan, Feis had been 
active during the war in the planning of postwar foreign policy. 
Throughout the forties, }'eis advocated a more conscious use of Ameri-
can economic power: 
6 . 
Kirkendall, 
/ 
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It would also be useful if agreement could be reached ••• under 
which, with proper safeguards and limitations, the natural re-
sources of dependent areas were opened to the qualified capital 
and enterprise of all friendly countries. The extention of the 
open door remains a sound American aim.7 
To Feis it was a basic principle to attempt to stabilize American 
economic development through actions "to relieve the needs of others, 
to provide aid in the development of their resources, and to protect 
fu ture by investing in theirs.
118 The recipient nations, however, our 
had to pledge faith in the principles of liberal trade. As Feis ex-
pressed it: 
Nations must qualify for economic aid, and cooperate by acting 
as reliable members of a peaceful international society. The 
advances of states of uncertain nature should be regarded with 
caution .•.• For the "Devil sick" and the "Devil well" continue 
to be two different principles.9 
While these ideas obviously carry a cent~al importance for an 
understanding of the policy of the Ilarshall l)lan, they also shed 
light on Feis's more recent writings whicb stand out more as an ac-
cumulation of isolated facts th~n as an interpretation of the mean-
ing of the events. In view uf this background, :Rt~eis' neglect of 
dealing with the world view of the American policy-makers seems to 
indicate that he has internalized their'world outlook to such a 
7Herbert Fe is, "Bconomics and Peace," l''ond.gn Folicv Henort, 
Vol. XX, no. 2, (1944), p. 17. 
8Ib'd 
___]:__ ., p. 14. 
9Ibid., p. 18. Feis repeated these ideas iJn 1950 in Diplomacv * i.~ 1Jol1<:t:r, a stri~dng pa~·allel to Kem.ian' s book about J\meri_can 
thplor~~- next :yeo.r. Hero F~~s mwle ~1 delJ.berate at~ompt to C1PJ)ly 
e e:xi.·81Jf'Y1C 0 '·' of the> i'·"'~·11ioc• +ci t·ne DO<'tT·"'Y' ·fortJf'<' 
- ~~ t.:_, ,.) • . . ,.. I \ V 1,:,... J • J ~~; ,__) \,,,' • J A _. -"- l...,) l \'l Col,.. L •• \... . ~· • ·"' Q • 
that he lost the ability to analyze it. 10 
The most recent argument of the academic realists has been for-
t d by Robert Tucker. Admitting that radical critique has shed mula e 
light on the outbreak of the Cold War, Tucker nevertheless retreated 
to the old proposition of the inevitability of conflict between the 
rpowers. "What state that achieved the power and eminence America supe 
achieved by the end of World War II has not wanted and sought to 
have the world evolve in an equilibrium favorable to it?1111 Denying 
American foreign policy both the disinterestedness and the innocence 
claimed previously by liberal historians, Tucker confirmed that im-
perial or imperialistic intentions were dominant in the sixties. The 
question was when these aspirations became predominant. Applied to 
Europe, the conventional security interest justified the early policy 
of cont!1.:Lnment wt-ii 0.h w::;i..c; 11 l'11nT'e or ] P8S synonymous with a balance-of-
12 power policy. 11 The shift of attention from security to j_rnperialism 
should be placed 11 somewhere in the middle to late fifties 11 or at 11 the 
time of the Cuban missile crisis, 11 when it became no longer plausible 
to equate the expansion of comnmnism with the expansion of Soviet or 
13 Chinese power. 
1
°Feis is sometimes excluded from the ranks of academic realism. 
(For instance, Kirkendall, Truman Period, p. 18). In the end this is 
only a matter of tcrrainology. It does r~ot seem unreasonable to dis-
card the criterion of active criticism and instead place the emphasis 
on the question of the ultimate inevitability of the outbreak of the 
Cold War. For a discussion of Feis' opinion, see Gar Alperovitz, 
QQ.ld Wa_E ~~ys, (New York, 1970), p. 7-12, C. Lasch' s introduction. 
lL{ 
( 1 olJert W. Tucker, The Radical Left and 11.merican Foreign policy, Baltinw:re' 1971)' p. 9~'3. --·---
121 
--.1?1.sl. ' p. 10<'.3. / 
- l.? -
Of special interest is the analysis of the Truman Doctrine. To 
it was an expression of an interventionism based on security TUcker, 
S1
.derations. Hence, the imperialistic implications\ which radical 
con 
~ critique tended to read into the document, were examples of the 
"habit of emphasizing statements that appear to support the view of 
naturB of conviction [about the necessity for expansion abroad] the 
· those that do not."14 Pointing out that the doctrine and ignorine; 
"did not identify freedom with capitalism, nor did it declare that 
all freedom is dependent upon freedom of enterprise," Tucker read 
the Truman Doctrine "almost entirely in libertarian and political 
. terms ;1 as opposed to the radical critique that stressed the economic 
15 implications of the doctrine. 
With this view1Tucker seems to reveal the basic weakness of his 
mitment "to assist free people to work out their own destinies in 
their own way" is startling, as Truman, less than a week before 1at 
defined the meaning of these key concepts of 
historical document can be understood sepa-
rately from its context, and .§:. m:;:iori to dismiss the connota tionsy 
Which provide the general meaning of an abstract expression, is un-
, likely to result in significant conclusions. J<'urthermore, it is ob-
~· Vious that the doctrine was designed for a broader Dcene than the 
13 
Tucker, Radig~l Left, p. 110. 
15Ib"d 
--b·, p. G:i. 
r . . . 
t domestic. For 
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the question of the motivation behind the statement, 
the important thing is to attempt to determine the content of these 
" expressions, which in themselves appear quite meaningless. This can 
only be made if the contemporary context as well as the way the 
statement was perceived in the United States is ·carefully examJned. 
The academic realists regardErlthe outbreak of the Cold War as 
an inevitable event, and hence, they seemed to refuse to take up the 
study of the assumptions which made the Cold War appear inescapable 
in the middle of the forties. Likely, their difficulties stem from 
the fact that this school was actively engaged in the formulation 
of this policy and that the then outlook has been internalized to 
the point where it is no longer a matter of conscious reflection. 
However, it appears from the vantage point of the seventies that the 
disasters of the foreign policy point out the increasing irrelevance 
.of an approach to diplomacy which deals only with the options and 
never with the basic world view. 
It is his bold and perceptive analysis of the underlying as-
sumptions that puts William Apple~an Williams in a position to offer 
an explanation that brings perspective and coherence to the conduct ' 
of foreign affairs. This interpretation is related to American 
Marxi?t tradition.16 
In his book from 1959, Williams attempted to prove that American 
diplomacy since the turn of .the century }lad been g.etermin~d primarily 
by the economic demands of.the world capitalist system. The postwar 
; 
16
w1111km Appleman Williams, The~Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 
Revised and enlarged edition, (Bant~m, New York, 1961[. 
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was molded upon these needs. "Open-door expansion, it ap-diploroacY 
d was the answer to all problems - the Russians, markets and peare ' 
materials. 1117 The \fol tanschauung, which was reflected in the open-
raw ... 
door concept was based on an economic definition of the world. At the 
Of World War II, it consisted of three aspects which explained end 
the policy of containment and were its rationale. The first viewed 
as being "evil but weak". The second defined the United States Russia 
as the symbol and aeent of positive good and hence of moral superio-
rity, as opposed to Soviet evil. The third aspect of the open-door 
outlook was "the fear that America's economic system would suffer 
a serious depression if it did not continue to expand overseas," be-
cause forces inherent in the very nature of the capitalist system 
18 
serve the institutions of the social and political fabric at home. 
In addition to the analysis of the basic assumptions behind. the 
Marshall Plan policy, ·rlilliams drew attention to certain economic 
features which explained why the plan was launched at this particular 
moment. To Williams "it would be a grave error to evaluate or inter-
pret the diplomatic moves of 1945 and 1946 in an economic vacuum," 
because the policy of the open-door "evolved concurrently with deep 
concern over the econooic affairs in the United States." At the end 
Of 1946, 11 an jncreaning concern over America's 'stagf,ering' consump-
tion and \'m.ste of D::tterials" appeared. In andi tion to this' the 
268. 
II""'" ' -18 -
r,, t'" Council of Economic Advisers expressed in early 1947 
J>residen i:J 
about the probabili:ty of a serious economic slump." At the 
•concern 
~ ti·me Western Europe failed to recover from the. war and take 
sallle ' 
in the international economy. 19 In short, the Marshall its place 
erved economic ends, both in the short run, by removing the Plan 5 
t of falling exports in a contracting situation, and in the long threa 
run, by building up potential markets. Both considerations were de-
fined by the attempt to secure a world order congenial to the needs 
of the capitalist system. 
Based on Williams' suggestion of the need to examine the basic 
assumptions behind the Marshall Plan, this paper is an attempt to 
examine, first, the economic situation in the United States in the 
second, the way the ERP affected the contemporary debate over issues 
of foreign policy. An answer to these questions might make it pos-
Sible to outline, thirdly, some of the basic economic assumptions 
which were expressed in the long range mo ti va ti on for the program, -
that is, to attempt to uncover the underlying economic objectives of 
the Marshall Plan and to investigate the concepts that defined the 
national interest. 
-· 
19 . 
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Ul· The Marshall Plan in A:r.J.erican Politics 
At the beginning of 1947, Americans were faced by the 
astonishing fact "that the peacetime economy can not only equal 
our war time economy but can surpass it."1 Already for 1946 as a 
whole, production was 50 percent over the prewar peacetime level 
and only 15 percent under the wartime peak. The annual rates of the 
last quarter v-;ere e~vTen a·bove the \1artimc hir~h, dccpi tc "bottle::-~ 
necks, shortages of materials and components, labor-management dis-
putes and other reconversion difficulties with retarding influence. 112 
By midyear, 1947, most of the remnants of the reconversion problems 
were cleared away and production had reached the annual rate of 
~ 225 billion. Americans 11ere ea ting more food per ca pi ta. than any 
previous yea~and they were supplied with more goods and services 
than ever before.3 
1 
Truman Pape_rs: 1947, p. 211. 
2 
Pr . U • S • , Congress, Senate and House, The Economic Eenort of the 
i9:~iden..t_, Transr:d. tted to the Congress, Jan. 8, 1947, \fashin,o;ton, 
. ' P • 1, and app. 8, table VIII, (hereafter Bconor:lic neport). 
7 
the p...>u • ~ ·' Congrer3s, 0erwte and House t llid,yGCJI'. Bconomic neport of 
~ re"llder·~- I'' •4 c . ; r· ' I jl'. - ·-~-1 ~, J.ransr~;Jct.c:d to on{')'eG~~,<uly 21, 1947, \'1ashington, 
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unprecedented production was followed by an unemployment ThiS 
was stable at the absolute minimum for an economy under-
. Arate that 
readjustment. At the end of 1946, more than 10 million de-
,Oj,ng 
il
·zed veterans and several other millions of wartime workers 
90b 1 
swallowed by the consumer producing industry without much )&ad been 
'tJ'OUble· In June, 1947, civilian employment was held at the record 
ievel of 60 million while unemployment throughout 194 7 was as low 
3 ·11· 
4 
.... 1 . 5 to 2. mi ion. 
The rise of production had, of course, to be balanced by a cor-
responding rise in purchasing power. The Bmployment Act of 1946 had 
clearly revealed that Congress as well as the administration cen-
tered their evonomic policy around the integration and interdepen-
4ence of employment, production, and purchasing power. Since 1929, 
the average income had, at the raiddle of 194 7, risen from 654 to 
1090 in fixed prices. In the fourth quarter of 1947, the annual rate 
ot national income had reached a total of more than ~ 200 billion. 
this meant that each person, on the average had received an in-
~se of more than 32 percent in power to buy goods and services 
at the current price level. 5 
On this background, l)resident Truman seemed justified when he 
two first economic reports to Congress vdth optimistic 
•tatements · "A · h · ~ · merica as never been so strong nor so prosperous. 
lor have 6 OUT ~lY'QSYJ8Ct.~ b 1 . ' t " C d . 1 mi, 1\J Y k r 1 ~ · een )r1gn er. orrespon ing y, ~ ~ or.._ 
Econoraic Hepori); 
19 4 7 ' p • 11-· l 5 . 
cT C1l'l • b ' J/) 4 7 ' 'p . 7 ; 
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S stated 
in an editorial on New Year's Day, 1947, that the pre-
~
_u.ing view among businessmen was that any recession in business 
would be comparatively small and shortlived and would in 
activity 
clear the way for a prolonged period of general prosperity. 7 
aD1 case 
One danger, however, threatened the miracle of reconversion. 
•one cloud is shadowing our economic future," as the President put 
it• "That cloud is caused by the sharp and rapid rise in prices. 118 
])Ile to pent-up demand, left over from the wartime savings, as well as 
to the general increase in income, demand outbalanced supply to such 
a degree that the sellers were in total command of the market. After 
price-control had been abandoned by Congress against the veto of the 
President in the middle of 1946, prices had skyrocketed. In April, 
1947, wholesale prices of textiles were 39 percent above the 1945 
level, of farm products 40 percent, of building materials 51 percent, 
and of food 53 percent higher than in 1945. 9 
This rise in prices exceeded by far the rise in personal income, 
and hence, caused the real purchasing power of the consumer's dollar 
to decline more than eight percent in the same period. Thus, in 1947, 
the increase in domestic consumption ouhTeighed the increase in in-
1lOme by more than 3. 5 billion. But in spite of a cash surplus in the 
6., 
~conomic Pe)')+ J 8 io47 1 2 d 1113 1. I ' r l~ , an . , ;1 , p . - _ an p . - • 
7 !_he~ York 'l'imes, Jan. 1, J_947, Sec. III 9 p. 1. 
BE 
JUl _conomic Pe "'O t J 0 194 7 VII d 9 J ··b · d 2 ~£....:., an . u , . , p • an . p . ; see· .a. so , .2::.....L. , y l, 1947, p. 1. 
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budget, purchasing power was still ample in the middle of 
because of wartime saving, expansion of credit, and 
f present saving rates. Furthermore, loans and emergency 
reduction 0 
countries in Burope and Asia sustained exports, and hence, 
aid to 
"buted to the fast absorption of production. In the second 
contri 
f 1947, the prices seemed at last to gain a little more quarter o 
t though the combined domestic and foreign demands still stabili. y, 
10 
exerted an upward pressure. -
Even before the Marshall Plan brought the problems of foreign 
demands and purchasing power into focus, Truman stressed the im-
. portance of export trade as "vital to the maintenance of a dynamic 
domestic econor.ay." Proposing an expansion of overseas investments "in 
tile first instance as an immediate outlet for goods and services, 
~ American development of overseas resources as "a means of per-
manently increasing foreign markets for our farmers and business-
881101111 
But on the other hand, Truman judged the current problems as 
being mainly of doDestic origin, stressing the maladjustments of 
' -
prices and wages as the primary reason for the heavy inflationary 
tendency of the economic situation. Accordingly, his short range 
:recommendatiom~ dealt exclusively with domestic prices while the 
long range advice for the economic development emphasized the 
-
10., 
.t<.,conorn_i_c:_ Fenort, July 21, 1947, p. 9..r..12 and p. 47. 
11 
Ibid. <'" - r! ·1 o /1 '7 - ·,1_ ~ ' , c<ll • ' - . _J'r I ' p • _J • 
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. ·on of export as the principal means of sustaining the peace-
'•Jpa.nsl. 
12 
\iJne economy· 
The tendency to contrast long range considerations for expan-
of foreign markets with short range concern for the domestic 
81on 
development of inf:lation was further underlined when Truman, on 
Jlarch 19, 1947, asked Congress for an extension of export control. 
One of Truman's reasons was undoubtedly his desire to make use of 
the export trade for the sake of diplomatic advantages in dealing 
with other n~tions. But the main cause was his preoccupation with 
the domestic supply and price structure. Thus, "unrestrained. export 
would inevitably limit the level of our own industrial production 
and eroployment." 13 Similarly, Dean Acheson stated that "it is ex-
\remely difficult under the present circumstances to increase the 
18 a great demand for commodities, 1114 an assertion, that is perhaps 
,,. 
even more important..,. as this address contained the embryo of the 
larshall Plan . 
Thus, already before the formulation of the :Marshall Plan, the 
•conomic policy of the Truman administration had revealed its inner 
,~ontradicticn between the needs for domestic stability and the desire 
12Ib· 
-i_ci., p. 4. 
13m Irum~ Pa~~: 1947, p. 181-182. 
14 
• Dean Acheson's address before the Del ta Council, Mississippi. ttt6 ' 1947; printed in Joseph M::irion Jone~:;, }'ifteen \Jeeb_:;: An In-
a Accolmt of the U en es i '~ of "c:l': e ~1-:p··,~h'' J J J>l"n ( l'Tew York -J-q·r:;-5:-) p. 277 f. - ·-->_. --~--~. _,, _" _ _.. ~~..:_:.:, ~~' - ,.., ~-_, /' I' 
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the export trade for political purposes. The justification 
was found in the interpretation of the economic experiences 
for this 
after 
world War I, a parallel always available for more or less 
application. Truman saw the cause for the recession in 1920 
careful 
iD the immediate abandonment of wartime control over domestic prices: 
"The retail prices had outstripped the increase in consumers incomes 
, 
80 
far that consuners buying power fell sharply and the price struc-
tures collapsed. 'l'hen followed the drop in production and employment," 
which had been one reason for the disaster in 1929 as the market 
bad never regained its internal stability and self-confidence. 15 The 
depression in 1929, however, also had another cause i.~hich was to play 
a major role in the debate of the Marshall Plan: " ••• not the sole 
cause .... But I do say a major cause. This was the economic war of 
1;:; 
bilateral preferences and restrictions. u-- 'l'his interpretation, 
called the 11 lesson of iforld War I," served to explain the contrast 
between short range economic objectives in domestic and in foreign 
policy. Moreover, it came to serve as a rationale for the economic 
policy of the Viarshall Plan. 1 7 
During the sp:ring of 1947, the situation in Western Europe had 
~eteriorated both from a political and from an economic point of 
15E 
low., conomic He port, July 21, 194 7, p. 6; nee also, Truman Papers: 
aA.i_, p. 250. 
- 16 ~ -._ Trumcm Papers: 194 7, p. 128, Address at 13aylor University, 
narch. 6, ig47 . 
.... , 
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view. On March 12, President Truman responded to the civil war in 
Greece.and to the threat of aggression against Turkey by launching 
the doctrine which carries his name. With.this statement, the United 
states had officially taken over the burden of securing the Middle. 
East and the, Mediterranean Sea from the alleged Communist aggression. 
The sudden liquidation of the British financial and military com-
mitment in Greece drew the attention of State Department planners 
to the general economic situation in Western Europe. Out of the 
shocking confrontation with a few figures of foreign trade statistics 
and with a general review of the economic and political prospects in 
this part of the world grew basic ideas behind the Marshall Plan. 
Obviously, the Marshall Plan did not mature in one single mind 
but was the result of many impulses. Among sQme of the most con-·· 
spicuous were the reports of William Clayton from a. trip to Europe, 
the Moscow Conference, Marshall's visits in burope an his way back from 
the. U.S.S.R., and Acheson's initiative of setting up study groups 
f • • th D 't t" 18 or reviewing e nuropean si ua ion. 
It has been argued that not only the basic assumptions, within 
which the plan was conceived, but also the more concrete ideas and 
devices of the plan, had long been on their way, and hence, that the 
European Recovery Program in fact manifested the climax of a long 
tradition of employing economic tactics as the main instrument of 
foreign policy. 19 There remains little doubt, however, that the 
1~Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 129-148; Kennan, Memoirs, p. 342-388. 
19walt~r LaFeber, America, Rusrda, and the Cold War, 1945-1966, 
(New York, 1968), p. 52. . ,, 
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events pr~ceding the launching of the plan created a tense excitement in 
ttie State Department, not dissimilar to the one which had followed 
Pearl Harbor. The impact of the r.ealization of a situation, the 
basic elements of which had more or less been apparent since the 
New Year, seemed so overwhelming to the persons involved.,. that a ra-
dical conversion of the traditional foreign policy appeared to be 
reflected in the Acheson and Marshall addresses. 20 
The first public statement which clearly connected the new in-
sight intm the European problems with the economic situation in 
the United States was Dean Acheson's Delta Address on May 8, 1947. 
Together with Marshall's Harvard Address on June 5, 1947, it seems 
to indicate the basic impetus for the launching of the ERP. Con-
, centrating on humanitarian aspects of the plan, Marshall only 
briefly mentioned that "the consequence of non-intervention should 
21 be apparent to all." Acheson was, more frank when he admitted that 
"the measures of relief and reconstruction have only in part been 
suggested by humanitarianism," and should instead be considered 
"chiefly as a matter of nationa,l self-interest~ 1122 As revealed by 
Joseph M. Jones, who drafted Acheson's ~peech, the background had 
20Both Jones and Kennan recall, the atmosphere and the excite-
ment of the time. See Jones, .Pifteen Weeks,p. 199-214; Kennan,, 
Memoirs, p. 345: "So earnest and intense were the debates, ••• that 
I recall one occasion,in the late evening, when I, to recover my 
composure, left the room and walked weeping around the entire build-
ing." 
21Printed in Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 281-284 . 
. " 
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been "the discl.osure in concrete terms of a portentous situation 
that had been known only in a general way. 1123 
The core of the Delta Address was a revelation of the disequi-
" librium between export and import. It was also an estimation of Eu-
ropean purchasing power: 
Our exports ••• during the current year are estimated to a total 
of 16 billion dollars •••• ~his represents one month's work for 
each man, one month's output from every farm, factory, and mine • 
••• In return •.• we estimate commodities from abroad to the 
value of about 8 billion dollars. This is just about half as 
much as we are exporting •••• How are foreigners going to get the 
United States dollars to 9over this huge difference? And how are 
they going to get the United States dollars necessary to cover 
a likely difference of nearly the same amount next year? These 
are some of the most important questions in international re-
lations today.24 
The questions to which Dean Acehson called attention remained 
at the center of the debate on foreign relations until the ERP was 
passed by Congress in the spring of 1948, Inflation dominated the 
domestic scene, while the political and economic future of Europe 
controlled the argument of foreign policy. These issues seemed to 
I 
meet in the question of a change in the economic relationship to Eu-
Well aware of the importance attached to these sensitive is-
sues, the President was very careful to·represent all powerful in-
terest groups in the study of the problems of the ERP. For that 
purpose, TrUtlan set up three special committees to hand in recom-
mendations that would cover a wide range of political opinions as 
23Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 208. 
24Ibid., p. 274-275. 
-
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, . well as a broad spectrum of influential economic groups. These com-
~·. mi ttees, which reflected both the. structure of American society and 
the basic economic objectives of policy, defined in the following 
months where the emphasis and the thrust of American foreign policy 
was to be placed. Composing these committees in such a way that they 
by themselves signified a reproduction of the socio-economic fabric 
of American society, Truman consciously planned to make full use of 
the basic consensus on the definition of national objectives and in-
terest. By this action Truman strengthened the ground for future bi-
partisan support of the conduct of foreign policy; with this action1 
he reflected one aspect of the one-dimensional character of American 
power and politics, as he, sure of the basic agreement among the in-
terests, incorporated potential opposition on the matter of tactics 
into the planning of the program. 25 
25The findings of the three committees were represented to the 
public in: 
a)U.S., Department of Interior, National Resources and For-
eign Aid: First Report to Congress from the Economic Cooperation !£-
ministration, Oct. 9, 1947, (Washington, D.C., 1947). "The task as-
signed was to explore the state of our physical resources and report 
on their adequacy to contribute to foreign reconstruction." (Truman 
Papers: 1947, Oct. 18, 1947). This comrpittee was set up to meet the 
widespread belief that the United States was at the bottom of its 
natural materials, especially the strategic ones. In this effort, 
it was only a matter of course for the committee to emphasize the 
need for access abroad to such products. The study became known as 
Krug's Report. 
b)Council of Economic Advisers, The Impact of Foreign Aid 
Upon the Domestic Economy, Oct., 1947, (Washington D.C., 1947). "An 
economic analysis of the effect th9.t a foreign aid program .•. would. 
have on •.. production, on domestic consumption and prices, and on 
government finance and the tax structure." (Truman Paoers: 1947, Nov. 
1, 1947). 'l'his report became publicly known as the Nourse Report. 
~)President's Committee on Foreign Aid,, European Recovery 
and American J,.id, H.eport from the Committee of 19 Distinguished . 
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Upon these reports, the administration constructed its re-
presentation of both short-run and long-run effects of the ERP upon 
the domestic economy. J:;'or the short range considerations, the cain 
argument rested on an estimation of the marginal effects of exports 
in an inflationary situation in an over":"employed economy. Though 
admitting that the rise in prices stemmed mainly from the docestic 
demand, the administration acknowledged that ''the final test of the 
inflationary impact is the size of a net export surplus" and that 
"it would of course be easier for us to win the battle against in-
flation if we could use the goods we are exporting to help meet the 
26 . 
heavy demand at home." Stressing the marginal effect of exports, 
especially in food, Harriman stated that "the extra withdrawal from 
the domestic market -~ •• has made a real difference in food prices. 1127 
Hence, the administration argued in mid-1947 that "a !'eduction 
in exports during the previous six months would not have reduced em-
ployment in the same proportion, since workers could have shifted 
from export to the domestic market. 1128 In mid-1948, Truman was even 
Private Citizens, Headed by the Secretary of Commerce, Averell 
Harriman, Nov. 7, 1947, (Washington, D.C., 1947). Because of its 
broader discussion of "the problem of European recovery and our in-
terest therein," and because of its assignment to furnish a "non-
political argument", (Truman Papers: 1947, Nov. 7, 1947), this re-
port became the most influential and best known of the three. It 
was generally known as the Harriman Report. 
26 House, Postwar Recovery, p. 467. 
·
27Harriman H.eport, p. 101-103. For a similar. opinion, see also 
Nourse Report, p~ 22-27. 
28E~ L ' R J l 21 19 1 r7 47 •conumic eport, u y, , Lt , p. • 
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sure that "the unfilled demands of the American market, with its 
enormous purchasing power, would sustain our ~rosperity even if 
foreign markets were sharply reduced. 1129 Seymour Harris, an active 
participant in the public debate, told a Chicago audience of bankers 
that the economic conditions were at the present relatively favor-
able for an adaptation of the economy to a smaller amount of export 
in the future because of the· strength of the domestic demand. 30 
Defending itself against charges from the left and from the Com-
munisiBthat the program was nothing but a device to find new out-
. lets for threatening surplus production, the administration pointed 
to the actual fact that no such surplus was in existence at the time, 
and neither was any anticipated in the near future. For the present, 
the administration had tc arguo against those who said that "every 
dollar's worth of goods in short supply, that we take out of our 
economy ••• is going to multiply the pressure in almost geometric 
proportions. 1131 Ta this, the executive answered, first that the 
sacrific·es "will be only a small fraction of the cost of winning 
the war, and they will be vital to winning the peace. 1132 Apart from 
the long-run arguments, which will be examined later, it was secondly 
29Economic Report, July, 1948, p. 36. 
30seymour B. Harris and G.B. Hoover, "The Marshall Plan and its· 
Costs," Journal of J:i"inance, Feb., 1948, p. 1-16; see also, Nourse 
Report, p. 74. ~ 
3lu.s., Congre~s, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Eu-
ropean Rec,overy Program, Hearings, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., January 
23, 1948, 'i(2 parts), p. 292; (hereafter Senate, ERP)~ 
/ 
. , 
32Bconomic Report, July 21, 1947,·p. 48. 
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that "we have already passed the export peak, 1133 and that 
pressure on the domestic economy would be less under the pro-
than the pressure which has resulted from the recent rate of gram 
1134 The present situation compelled Congress to take action 
exports. 
against the inflation, anyway. As Harriman stated no less than three 
ti.Jiles during the Foreign Relations hearing: "I feel that controls 
; 111 be necessary regardless of the .European program." 35 
These arr,uments were in full accordance with the estimated 
amount of exports and imports under the ERP. 36 Assuming that the 
appropriations. were passed' "our exports will be somewhat less in 
1948 than in 1947, and our imports are expected to increase some-
vhat.1137 Hence, the burden on the domestic economy would diminish 
, 
in the short run as the favorable balance of· trade, the vast sur..,. 
I,; 
plus of exports over imports, was sunDosed to decrease even under 
38 the Marshall Plan. 
Reconsidering the i~ediate state of economic affairs from the 
Yi.ewpoint of the administration, the evidence seems to underline 
t.' 
for the inflationary tendencies of the unsatisfied domestic 
33 House, Postwar Recoverv, p. 464, and p. 467. 
34
_Ibid., p. 473. 
35s enate PRP 
' _.i:i_l_, p. 275-277. 
37 
House, Postwu~ Recoverv, p. 467. 
9f3-102. 
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rather than to point to the danger of nn ir:uninent recession 
a radical decline in exports. To the administration, the fear 
and the fear of surplus production for contracting 
related to each other, in so far as they represented 
way to depression. On the other hand, the 
:-;;' d. es for each of these stages appeared to be different, and to 
, reme i 
f degree even contradictory to each other, according to"the les-
.! eouie 
War I". 39 Hence, a close consideration of whi~h of 
stages the Truman administration deerJed to be at hand might 
a key for an understanding of the short-run motivation behind 
Plan. 
Williams seemed to emphasize an impending recession due to a 
production, as he pointed to the "increasing 
and to "thP. :E-,ro-
a serious economic slump 11 • 40 The evidence was found in the 
the President's Economic Advisors, a source which, un-
. k 1 . J ' t 41 Al . t . is nown on y in ones accoun . so, premoni ion 
was reflected in Acheson's Delta Address:"If the ex-
_cted export decline due to foreign inability to pay coincided with 
ness in the domestic economy, the effect on production, prices, 
r1iGht be most serious. 1142 
39' . Sec above, p.24. 
40 . 
W1lliar:w, 'rr::~, p. 267 f.; see also, Lal<'eber, .Q91d \1ar, P. 4 7. 
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It seems to be true that segments of business and industry.pre-
recession in the middle of 1947. The Economic Report of 
1948, admitted "tha~ the impact of expected foreign aid 
wide attention, stimulating economic expectations. n43 I:t .is 
however, to what degree this prognosis was believed in the 
during mid-1947. For his part, Truman never referred to 
it •. To the contrary, Trw:ian concentrated his attention on the prices 
and "the very high profits" and denied any expectations of recession. 
if the price structure was kept intact. 44 
On April 21; 1947, Truman repeated his opinion of the nature and 
the stage of the development of reconversion. He charged that "profits 
in the aggregate are breaking all records," having even surpassed the 
war level 133 percent. Again pointing to his.concern over inflation, 
he stated that "there is only one sure formula for bringing on a re-
cession or a depression: that is to maintain excessively high prices. 1145 
Hence, .. a fQreign aid program at this time would tend to endanger the 
economy rather than relieve it. The threat to stable development 
came primarily from skyrocketing prices and subsequent undercutting 
of income and purchasing power. The task of the administration, as 
Truman argued, was to curtail or decrease the demands both from do~ 
mestic and foreign sources in order to preserve the price structure. 
The Marshall Plan had to be undertaken not because, but in spite of 
43~conornic Report, Jan., 1948, p. 42y 
44Truman Papers: 1947, April 10, 1947, p. 
; 
45 \. Ibid., p. 213-214. 
. " . 
···~ 
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1ts short-run· effects on the domestic economy: "It is worth enduring 
temporary shortages within the United States, t'his will bring 
~ 46 ;, iasting benefits in the long run," 
Confronted with the disequilibrium between supply and demand 
the abandonment of price control, the administration was left 
with a few frustrating alternatives. One possibility was .to appeal 
to business and labor to show ·modesty, and this was done continuously 
throughout this period, but as r:i,.sing prices show, with very little 
.result. Secondly, Truman could attempt either to increase production 
-or to decrease the demand by fiscal means. Thirdly, he could ask for 
··powers to control demand. 47 
~he possibility of changing supply or demand through Congress 
was blocked, too. Ever .. since the midterm election of 1946, the Re-
(• 
f t publican Party, which controlled the majority in Congress, had been 
( 
~ · pressing for a tax reduction •. Even with a· surplus budget1 very little 
f. 
i 
could be accomplished this way. Similarly, the chance of inc_re·asing 
production was effectively obstructed by the law of diminishing re-
turns, "the stubborn and intractable fact a:bout an economy already 
operating at peak .•• that output can not be expanded except by slow 
degrees. 1148 Left was only the.alternative of convincing Congress, 
who had already dropped price controls, that the only way to main-
tain a reasonable purchasing power and. to avoid the economic and 
. 
46Economic Report, July 21, 1947, p. 48. 
47Harr,y S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols., (Garden City, lLY., 1955), 
Vol. II, "Yep.rs of Tr~al and Hope", p. 112-117. 
·' 
48Bconomic Report, Jan., 1948, p. 43. 
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social consequences of inflation was to stabilize the price struc-
ture by curtailing profits through interference with the law of 
supply and demand. 
~he commitment to the Marshall Plan added a strong argument to 
the case of controlling the economic development. Since 1946, Truman 
had stressed the obvious social injustice of inflation. As the ide-
ological frontiers of the Cold War hardened, he referred more and 
more often to the challenge to the free economy. "Our system of pri-
vate enterprise is now being tested before the world. If we can prove 
that it is more productive and more stable ••• than other economies, 
we shall have won the test. 1149 In this context, the Marshall Plan 
added another argument that linked the potential success of the p'lan 
to the domestic price structure. 
To-this came, of course, the pure economic considerations. It 
was a self-evident condition for a succesful achievement of European 
recovery that scarce dollar resources and American aid were not to 
be undermined by rising prices in the United States where the comma-
dities1at least in part 1were to be bought~ Seymour Harris concluded 
that'tshould inflationary forces cumulate, the monetary costs of the 
program would rise ••. and the ERP would be in jeopardy. 1150 The ad-
ministration fully agreed in this opinion and recognized 11 that 
carrying it tERPJ out will make it all the more important that we 
49Truman l1apers: 1947, p. 212. 
5-oSeymour E. Harris, The European H.ecovery: Program, (New York, 
1948), p. 185. 
j 
I 
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invoke the measures req.uired to stop the inflation. 1150 
Hoping that "in highlighting the inflation ••• the ERP may well 
mobilize the anti-inflationary forces of this country and contribute 
towards solving the problem of inflation, 1152 the administration 
started to link the issues of domestic policy more and more closely 
to the foreign aid program. Already, shortly after Dean Acheson's 
Delta Address, Truman had asked for an extension of the act, which 
during the war had provided authority for maintaining control over 
certain goods and strategic materials with the mo.tivation that "it 
is of direct interest to our own economy and indispensable in sup-
porting our international policy." On the very day of Marshall's 
Harvard Address, Truman stated that "the fact that necessary for-
eign aid programs add to our economic problems at home makes it 
all the more important that we handle these domestic problems with 
t:"Z 
vigor and common sense. 11 ..1_.1 
Backed by the reports of the special committees, that all em-
phasized that "the foreign aid program compels us to face the do-
mestic problems squarely," Truman's efforts to make Congress, for 
. 
reasons of fore~gn policy, pass the regulation that had already been 
defeated as a means of solving the domestic problems, reached a 
.climax in the calling of a special session of Congress. 54 In his 
.5lEconomic Heport, Jan., 1948, p. 43. 
5?Truman Papers: 1947, p. 263. 
54Ndurse Report, p. 99. 
' • ti 
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radio address of October 24, 1947, Trucan motivated this action by 
stressing that"peace and prosperity, prosperity for all our people, 
peace for all the world," were two aspects of the same issue, because 
". "the same measures would be necessary and should be used" to secure 
the Marshall Plan a proper success and to stabilize the domestic 
economic development.55 
But Truman did not attempt to make the ERP dependent upon the 
granting of controls. In his diaries Truman wrote: "Ltold them that 
I had taken this action partly so that Congress might take steps to 
halt the rising price spiral within our own nation but mostly to 
meet the crisis in Western Europe. 11 56 
The Marshall Plan necessarily had to bring out in the open dis-
agreement among the different interest groups that were affected by 
such pri:ui:u1e; of the export pump. This disagreement was reflP.~ted in 
the debates in Congress and at the hearings, where, for instance, 
Senator Hickenlooper asked for "a little more businesslike calcula-
tion" of the effects to the domestic economy, "especially as it now 
exists and the pressures that are on it .•.. It does not do a great 
deal of good, in my mind, to say that years from now, we will be 
much better off . 1157 Just as there were interest groups that were 
opposed to the liberalization of trade because of a favored position 
in th~ domestic r:iarket, 58 the Marshall Plan was opposed by groups 
55Truman Papers: .1.211,, p. 364. 
56Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 117. 
570 ~ t 1 ~Rl) 291 0ena e, ' P• - · 
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that were concerned about taking out income~producing goods and 
" ••• merely donating these to other countries which in turn will pro-
duce income and profit out of those physical goods~ 1159 Other, per-
haps more influential groups preached the blessings of expansion of 
60 
exports. 
But it seems a mistake to equate the administration with those 
who favored expansion of trade at all costs. Instead, the government 
argued ·for the long range benefits of the Marshall Plan even at the 
expense of domestic difficulties. Although surpassed by the needs of 
foreign policy ~rtd by the prospect to advantages in the long run, 
the problems of inflation enjoyed a high position on. the list of 
priorities of the Truman administration. Only when the hope to solve 
the domestic troubles through controls had been totally destroyed 
by Congress, did '.L1ruman choose bstween the BlWL' L a.ml the long range 
issues, between the domestic and the foreign policy. 
This choice was based on an estimation of the long range needs 
and benefits. The question remains as to how the admi~istration de-
fined and conceived these requirements as,par.t and parcel of the 
national interest of the United States. · 
58see later, p. 41. 
598enate, BRP, p. 290; for the disagreement among various in-
terest groups, see House, Postwar Recovery. 
60se~ for instance the testimony of National Association of 
Manufacture's, Senate, BHP. " 
/ 
IV. The Marshall Plan in European Perspective 
· It has been attempted to examine the short-run motivation of 
the Marshall rlan in this paper. Focusing on the arguments of the 
administration it has been stressed that the estimated impact of 
the ERP on the then economic situation tended to add to the domestic 
problems rather than to solve them. Furtherm~re, it has been demon-
strated how Tru.ruan tried to point to the ETIP in his effo:i·t to i:. ~vµ 
the inflation, although Congress refused to consider the question 
of domestic controls. 
In the end, however, the reasoning both of the administration 
and of those interest groups, who were concerned over the economy 
from other angles than that of the administration - angles, which 
were often directly corresponding to their location in production, 
reveal the same basic features. More important than the disagree-
ment among the different interest groups was the theme of the dis-
c:µssion.over the short-run issues of the Marshall Plan policy, the 
shared ideas of the function of the government as a stabilizer of 
the domestic economic development and as a guarantor for the pre-
servation~f a socio-economic structure conducive to the interests 
/ 
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·0 f business as a class. In the short run the government was to make 
smooth the economic growth and with the Keynesian tools remove the 
threat of recurrent depressions, which had menaced the social order 
at various times, and hence, maintain a concensus on the objectives 
of foreign policy. 
Exactly because the validity of these goals .. was never ques-
tioned, it was possible for Truman to use the belief in the con-
nection between domestic and foreign policy as an ~rgument. In or-
der to try to determine these basic assumptions behind the reason-
ing of the Mar~hall Plan, in order to define aspects of the ideology 
of political economy, it is necessary to examine the long-run objec-
tives of the ERP. 
In a recent essay, Thomas G. Paterson set out to define the re-
lationohip between American fears of communicm and the need for ex-
panding markets ·to avert depression, as these themes were revealed 
in the motivation behind the Marshall Plan. The connection Pater-
son found in the "peace and prosperity concept". This concept held 
"that a prostrate Europe would be a breeding ground for Communism, 
' 
that a faltering European economy would. be unable to provide the 
goods and markets so essential to the world and American economies;' 
1 
and hence, endanger the American conceptfuon of peace. 
So far Paterson seemed to follow Williams' definition of the 
issues of foreign policy in the Cold War. In his conclusion, how-
;I.Thomas G Paterson, "The Quest for Peace and Prosperity," in 
Barton J .. Bernstein, ed., l)oli tics and Policies of the Truman Ad-
ministration, (Chicago, 1970), p. 6. 
/ 
' 
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ever, Paterson moved beyond Williams' thesis and stressed the role 
of tactics rather than that of ideology as· a means for an under~ 
I 
standing of the conduct of foreign affairs. "Rather the central 
questions are: How and to whom did the United States extend its 
help? How did the United States use.its economic power'?" 2 
Paterson found support for his shift of emphasis in the fact 
that neither business nor government officials supported·a build-
up of the Cold War in order to make money. These groups "would 
rather have made their profits an easier way - preferably through 
secure, unencumbered, and ardent economic expansion at home and 
abroad. ,; 3 Some. business groups like the wool-producers denied the 
need for an aggressive expansion of foreign trade, and in spite of 
the advocacy of open-door and liberal trade principles, the ad-
ministration and many American corporationo practiced the use of 
.bilateralism, state trading, import and export controls, and car-
tels. 4 .n.lso in the case of help to underdeveloped regions, "there 
was a shortcoming in the fulfillment of the peace and prosperity 
concept," as American aid oftep went to reactionary regimes~ which 
were resisting the development of Ameri9an oriented social and eco-
nomic institutions that presumably could have resisted and counter:: 
balanced unstable and revolutionary polimics. 5 
2Ibid., p • 105. 
. 3 . 
· Ibid•, p • 104. 
. 4. Ibid., p. 85. 
i 
5 '· Ibid., p. 104. , 
/ 
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In order to determine whether Paterson with his conclusion is 
~; rnoving beyond Williams or whether his analysis is rather to be re-
~,: 
~. garded as a retreat, it is necessary to take a second look at the 
·: 'C·American ideology of political economy. 
It is unquestionably true that promotion of liberalization of 
trade played an important role in the planning and conduct of for-
eign policy in the post-war years. 1.l.'.his applied to the European 
countries as well as to the world as a whole. Willard L. Thorp, 
·Assistant Secretary of State, expressed a widely held opinion when 
he stated: 
Our entire foreign policy, in which reciprocal trade agree-
ments and the proposed International Trade Organi2ation are 
important ·elements, is directed toward achieving a vast ex-
1 pansion of trade among all nations with benefits to all.6 
Hence, the idea behind the ITO ~ame, from the American point 
of view, close to being a corollary to the conditions of the ERP-
policy. Undersecretary of Commerce, William L. Clayton,- had a clear 
opinion of this relationship, when he characterized the ERP as a 
11 short-range program for one part of the world" and ITO as the"lo-
gical extension in the long range," and added about tying the ITO 
with the Marshall Plan that "it is already tied in. 117 
Already the Marshall Address had clearly made any aid depen-
dent on a joint European initiative. It remained the American in-
6nepartment of State Bulletin, XVII, (November 2, 1947), p. 
865, "Buropean Recovery -:- a Project for America." (Hereafter DS~) .. 
7u.s., Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, United 
States 1''oreipn Policy for 1)ostwar Recovery; Hearings, 80th Cong., 
1st and 2nd sess., 2 parts, 1948, p. 323-325. (Herafte:r House, 
l)ostwar i~ecovery). . ,, 
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through the ERP "to break down the nationalistic 
which have caused so much economic difficulty in the past," 
to establish an integrated European system ·open to Ameri-
export and investment. 8 It was Harriman's hope that "the co-
:operative relationships ••• undertaken to develop during the recov-
.,, .. 
period •••. may lead to permanent relationships. 119 
This policy, however, confronted the United States with the 
problem of being a creditor. In spite of a growing realization 
the difficulties that arise from being rich among paupers, and 
the need to balance exports against imports, the administration 
·.still had to calm down the fear of competition in the- domestic mar-
"·'.:· 
ket. Clayton assured the business community that "there is no peril 
to our tariff system in the ITO," because ITO was only supposed to 
cope with "quantitative restrictions, preferential arrangements, 
discriminatory practices and so on," leaving intact the structure 
of tariffs as a means for trade protection.10 As Truman expressed 
the difference: "Governments may impose tariffs, but they do not 
dictate the quantity of trade, the sources' of imports, or the de-
stination of exports. Individual transactions are a matter of pri-
vate choice. 1111 
B,I P t R 462 rouse, os war ecovery, p. . 
9 Ibid. , p. 46 3. 
lOibid. , p. 326 
11u.s.\ President, "Harry S. Truman: 1947", Public Paners of 
the 1-'resider1ts of the United Sta tP.a, ... (Washington, D. C., 1962), p. m. (dcre:.1.fter'::ir'lllii'an .i'apers). -
/ 
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Truman confirmed his opinion of liberal trade as something to 
be seen strictly in the context of economic systems,_ when he ex":" 
plained that he preferred the expression "the trade of free men" 
to the term "free trade 11 • 12 This point of view was connected with 
a co~sideration of the American economic strength. Given the eco-
nomic power of American industry, which controlled well above 50 
percent of the industrial capacity of the world, and considering 
the fact that the 62 largest manufacturing corporations in the 
United States at the end of the war had accumulated liquid capital 
sufficient to purchase the assets of nearly 80 percent of all cor-
porations in the United States,13 it seemed that Truman's defini-
tion of free trade represented the climax of the open-door trading 
policy,which, for the first time, was extended to the European 
powers. 
14 Along with the promotion of free access to European markets, 
the presentation of the Marshall Plan expressed a more mature under-
standing of the need to increase imports in order to stabilize 
the economic development in the long run. The lesson of the twenties 
! 
had not been in vain. Already on ApriL 13, 1947, Harriman had writ-
ten an article in the Washington Post, "'Buy American' is a dead 
_,slogan," stating that the gap of surplus exports over imports would 
12Ibid., P• 275. 
13The Federal Trade Commission's Report, in Denna F. Fleming, 
The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960, (2 vols., Garden City, N.Y.; 
1961),. I, p. 437. 
14see~Foreign Aasisstance Act,,Sec. 115 (b), in Seymour E. 
Harris, .Guropcnn Recovery Proeram~ (Chicac;o, 1948), p. 76 • 
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have to be.narrowed, if the United States were to maintain the level 
of export.. Instead, he proposed the slogan "Let's import for peace 
and prosperity. 1115 Clayton also emphasized that "we have to import 
many more things in order to sustain our own economy •••• By helping 
these countries to get on their feet and increase their production, 
I think, we do not only not hurt ourselves ••• we help ourselves in 
the markets of the world. 1116 
One of the most enlightening documents for a better under~ 
derstanding of the economic universe, in which the idea of expansion 
of trade and the idea behind the ERP was conceived, is probably 
the Address QQ Foreign Economic Policv, delivered by Truman on a 
visit to 'Baylor University, March 6, 1947. Defining the various 
crucial elements of his economic and political credo as well as the 
relationship between theoe elements, Truman illuminated the basic 
assumptions behind his foreign policy.17 
Stating that "peace, freedom and world .trade are inseparable" 
and that "there is one thing that the Americans value more than 
peace. It is freedon. Freedom of worship, freedom of speech, free-
dom of enterprise," Truman went on to e.xplain that "the devotion to 
freedom of enterprise in the United States has deeper roots than 
·the desire to protect the profits of ownership. It is part and par-
15u.s., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 
1st sess., 1947, Appendix, p. 1859. -
16House, Postwar Recovery, p. 327. 
17Truman Paners: 1947, pp. 167-172. 
\ 
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eel of what we call American." Denying that freedom of speech and 
of worship could exist without the freedom of enterprise and fur-
ther stressing the devotion t'o fight for free enterprise, Truman 
repeated that "our foreign relations, political and economic, are 
indivisible. We cannot say that we are willing to cooperate in one 
field and are unwilling to cooperate in the other." Finally, Truman 
) defined free enterprise as the system "in which the major decisions . 
I 
'· 
t 
~; 
are made, not by governments, bµt by private buyers and sellers .• 11 
The obvious militancy of these remarks was further accentuated by 
Truman's promise to take an active part in the "process of expanding 
trade." 
The close relationship, if not identity between free trade, 
free enterprise, and peace was concentrated in the expression "free 
men's trade". The extent, to which this represented the opinion of 
other members of the cabinet, was indicated when Harriman, on the 
21st of May, 1947, stressed the American stake in an "expanding 
world commerce, not only in terms of prosperity, but also in terms 
of peace. 11 He reiterated that economic and political considerations 
. 18 . 
"are inextricably intertwined in the modern world." Marshall told 
an audience of businessmen: "We are all stockholders in the same 
compagny - the United States of America." Emphasizing that "the para-
mount question before us can be stated in business terms," he 
continued: 
I am not a businessman, but I have some knowledge out of my 
i 18 ' Co'ngressional He cord, 80th Cong. , lot sess. , 194 7, app. p. 2395. 
. ~ \ 
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experience of what.had been required in the past to preserve 
certain of our national assets in security, peace, and free-
dom •••. I think that is our role as a leader in a distressed 
world.19 
However, the reason why the Baylor Address is so important for 
the analysis of the American political ideology in the postwar 
world is to be found both in its aggressiveness and in the frank 
statement of the objectives of foreign policy. But also the address 
is most significant for what it obscures. Even a careful reading 
doe~ not reveal exactly which charges were launched against the Krem-
lin and which against the Western European capitals. This balanc.e 
seems to explain. aspects of the meaning of the Marshall Plan, 
especially as this ambiguity was carried over into the debate of 
the ERP. 
According to the Harriman Report, "a European recovery program 
is an investment in the continued survival of a world, economically 
stabilized and peacefully conducted. 11 A failure to meet the chal-
lenge of the program could bring about a Communist take-over of 
western Europe, and the domestic consequences would be such "as no 
American could easily tolerate: the swift and complete conversion 
to a military footing .••• The immediate.and sweeping limitation of 
our economic and political life, ••. perhaps even of our very form 
20 . 
of government." The meaning of this i~as quite clear. The United 
19nsB, XVIII, Jan. 25, 1948, p. 171. 
20Presidents Committee on Foreign Aid, European Hecover and 
American Aid. (Washington, D.C., November, 1947), p. /19. Hereafter 
Harrir:ian H.eport). 
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States could not tolerate a Europe that was dominated by one power. 
In 1947, this was an accepted definition of the United States' physi-
cal security interest which the military engagement in two world 
wars had made a common-place in international politics. 
The Harriman Report, however, also contained another definition 
of the American national interest: 
-It [the Marshall Plan] will involve sacrifices but it may also 
be cheaper in the long run. The illusion that it would be 
thrifty to do nothing would be shattered if, by such a policy 
the future existence or development of our economic and politi-
cal institutions should be seriously jeopardized. 21 
The quest~on is apparently left open as to what exactly would 
cause the threat to United States domestic integrity. The answer, 
however, is soon given. After an enumeration of the importance of 
European buying power to the domestic economy, the report continues: 
The deterioration of the European economy, lack of means to 
obtain essential imports would force European countries to re-
sort to trade by governmental monopoly - not only for economic 
but for political ends. The United States would almost inevi-
tably have to follow suit. The resulting system of state con-
trols, at first relating to foreign trade, would soon have to 
be extended into the domestic economy to an extent that would 
endanger the survival of the American system of enterprise.22 
Defining the threat to national integrity in terms of any Eu-
ropean action, that could limit the expansion of foreign trade, 
Harriman went far beyond the conventional balance-of-power defini-
tion of national security. 23 By making the American economic arid 
21Ibid., p. 18. 
22Ibid. 
2 3My~attention was pointed to this aspect of the ERP by Robert 
W. Tucker,' The Ha.di cal Left and American Foreip;n Policy, Studies in 
. .,. 
- 49 -
political system directly dependent on the internal order of the 
~uropean powers, Harriman reflected a clear imperial interest and 
obvious imperial intentions which had been apparent in the formu-
lation of American foreign policy at least since the turn of the 
century. But for the first time this conception was explicitly ex-
tended to the metropolises of the European imperial powers, and for 
the first time, vast_ political and economic resources were utilized 
to reach objectives so far beyond the traditional security interest. 
The·way, the Harriman Report arranged the two definitions of 
the dependence .. of national integrity upon the European situation 
is revealing. Because the consequences of a Oommunis·t take-over or 
of the adoption of protectionistic policies by European governments 
were both identified as a threat to the social and economic insti-
tutions in America, the traditional domestic acception of the con-
ventional definition of security could be exploited to ensure the 
popular approval of the imperial definition. Hence, the fusion of 
the two concepts by itself promoted the policy of the administration 
as the Marshall Plan could be argued as a'necessary tool to secure 
.. 
economic access to Europe in_a logical extension of the military 
engagement during the war. Carried to its ultim~te extremes, howeve~ 
this reasoning would inevitably have lead to advocating a military 
intervention in Eastern Europe. But that, of course, .was beyond the 
intentions of the administration, who merely wanted to utilize the 
argument for reasons of its liberal appeal. Still, the Truman ad-
i Internation~l Affairs Number 15, (Baltimore, 1971), p. 55-156. The 
conclusions, however, which will be drawn in this paper from the· 
distinction between the narrow and the broader def~nition of na-
tional interest are quite different fron Tucker's suggestions. 
. -~ 
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·administration must carry a heavy resopnsibili ty for its elaborations 
on the fusion between the two concepts of na.'tional interest. 24 
Two points have to be underlined in order to understand how 
the definition of the imperial interest was directly reflected in 
the pursuance of the policy of the Marshall Plan and how the plan 
in the arguments of the Truman administration became identical with 
the long-run and basic national objectives of the United States' 
foreign policy. 
First, it is necessary, once more, to point to the importance 
the administration placed on exports in general: "Millions of Ameri-
cans •.• depend on foreign trade. If we are to protect the interests 
of these people, in their investment and employment, we must see to 
it that our foreign trade does not decline. 1125·Harriman stated that 
11 durine the war we trenend?usly expanded our industrial and agricul-
tural production, and we now need permanen_t and expanding world 
26 . 
markets." Also Clayton stressed this in the strongest terms during 
the Congressional Hearings: 
Mr. Mansfield: It would appear to ne, that one of the basic 
elements in the considerations of the ERP would be the fact 
that over the long term we would bunefit tremendously, from 
an economic point of view; and' if we don't we will have de-
24For the ambiguity that was introduced into the debate, see 
the discussion bet~reen Marshall and Lodge, Senate, ERP, p. 98 ff. As 
it seems, the stand of the administration on the problem of defining 
the national interest without resortine to right~wing nhetoric has 
a striking parallel in Truman's position in the question of internal 
security. 
25Truman Papers: 1947, p. 171-172. 
26 . . Conc;rensional Record, 80th. -Con~., 1st sess., 194 7, app. p. · 
2395. 
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flation in this country. i'fe will have surpluses. Nobody will 
have anything to buy our goods with, and then where will we 
be'? 
Mr. Clayton: I think that is exactly right. We cannot, in the 
United States, be the only prosperous country in the world. 
\tie cannot be the only free enterprise country in the world. 
If we want to keep free and prosperous we had better have some 
cocpany ...• If we do not ..• we are going to make such radical 
changes, I am afraid, in our own economy in this country that 
it would be very difficult for a democratic, free-enterprise 
system to make.27 
The point Clayton made about the necessity of liberal trade 
with Burope, if radical change in Aoerican society was to be e.scaped, 
vas the second basic assuoption behind the riarshall Plan. Moreover, 
Clayton t iecl this to the assumption of the need for expansion 
of exports in the idea of the relationship between foreign and do-
aestic policy. The preservation and expansion of the European mar-
solubly tied to not only the conservation of peace, but to the sur-
vival of the social, economic, and political institutions of the 
United States i tseJf. 
The accordance with the Baylor Address is obvious. In this, 
!ruman had stated that if a more liberal pattern of trade was not 
United i3tates would soon 11 find its elf in the hvsiness 
foreign goods ar:iong importers ann foreign markets 
among exporters and telling every trader what he could buy and sell~ 
2e,,, 
~1~.CJ.l 
when, and where. It is not the lu11erican way. It 
28 
to ;)eace. 11 'l'horp, also, expressed a similar view: 
L?_:i~r , l ' . 1? o . 
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I wish to emphasize, then, that the pattern of international 
trade adopted by the leading trading nations must be a matter 
of great concern to those who wish to preserve the American 
economic systeo in the United States, let alone strenghten it . 
• • • }'ailure to carry through effectively on our pa::·t means that 
we risk our international leadership in the economic field, our 
foreign trade, and some aspects of our economic system itself .29 
At least some time before the nilitary security of the Unito,d 
. states was considered at stake, the Truman administration had de-
veloped the concept of a close relationship between free access to 
expanding markets and the socio-economic institutions in the United 
its elf. Thorp stated that he saw "no ef>cape from the funda-
proposition: We cannot separate our dooestic and foreign 
affairs. 1130 To the administration the only alternative to expansion 
was domestic controls, equated with Socialiso, and far 
change at home. ~here was no other possibility in existence. 
of free enterprise and the preservation of democratic prin-
The other leads in the direction of Socialism and state 
To some degree, the ~arshall Plan can be seen as an expression 
~;of the conventional balance-of-power concept of n::ttional interest. 
that respect it signified a continuation of the First World War 
J 
29
u.s., Department of Gtate, Pro11cm~ 
omic l'..2_liQl'_, rublica ti on ;~7 50. Cornmerc:i.al 
ept., 1947. p. 26. 
30 Ibj_d. 
---.. -
XVIII, ~-UilC 
of tho U .8. "Forej_@ ;t;co:,.. 
104, released 
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· the attempt to build a pardon sanitaire as far east as possible 
,f)y 
· rder to contain the Cor:lIIlunist contagion behinP, a barrier of 
',ill 0 
ng national states. But also, the Marshall Plan went beyond stro 
in its implementation and accomplishment, as the ERP policy 
the internal order of the European powers as a necessary 
for a stabilization of the American social and economic 
even further than that, it appeared to Washington 
that the European problems were not to be limited to the geographic 
European continent. Instead Europe had to be con-
in ~ world-wide context. 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
I , 
I 
V. The Marshall Plan as a World View 
Most historical accounts of the genesis and basic motivation 
of the Marshall Plan have found it natural to treat the EE1-1 as a 
specific European problems. To some extent, the ar~u-
~aent of the Harvard Address has been taken at its face value. 
~Jarshall explained that Europe had been given priority, because 
·,'; 
·~~·the ".7"~~:.r !:.~;~2- t,.:rd.8 Q±° t~c v:~r-ld p~~o °b2-(;!'!l ~s e_ 'T,Tl'\r"'\10 "V'll~r<,1-l"Vln.C ~ ... - .... ~. -· ··- .... 'l -·~-~ - .. _ _, ---
direction of our assistance to the critical areas where it can 
most ir:imediately effective. 111 Al though this statement focussed 
Europe, it also extended the perspective of the plan beyond, 
Marshall ex1)ressec1 the American view of the relatiom:;l1ip betwe1:m 
ope and its dependent areas. 
In his Delta Address, Dean Acheson had been mo~e o~tspoken: 
going to have to concentrate our eraergency as;-:;i~1tance in 
it will be most effective in building worl~ political 
econor:1i·c c•i,. l ·1·t r • i·' <'t .;~ ... l·ib) ·. l + r_;,1·· ~ ].; •• .0 " 2 •,. .._, a._1}. J_}, ••• ln .o~, er_,_110 _,_ era __ vTc.uJ_nt_; po .. _,_CJ.e~,. 
1 
U · ~i. , Congruss, Senato, Cornn:L ttee on Foreign Hela t :Lcms, E1J:-
ean h(;C0V(31~\T 1)·rr,c~P0"\' ·1')·.-,c'l (' .i)nr'l)TY'.()}''~ c• ':>jjn 1\• 1 elrrr·r011 Y)(1 ]·»1~'01~!-:;'.;-
--· - - ' .1. ~ V-- ~ ~-.1.11 • J (_-l.•_.1 __ _. -1- ·-- -,.__,_ ,.,,_, < ,_,~) (,J., '--~ ..• ,,,_, .. ~.. ....!_, '- __ _l _I ... _,c;.._ 
n' t.10 ti~c~~1 · .',. --i0---;E, .~:::-·-le 1 7.-::1--1~-1· (). ·c-:--.L-11 ·r~J· -·-·-=10 1~1· --- -------
, .i...).' _._ .. , i.1 ... _)~ ... Ji...}•' - _J t ' ,,. - ....... , , • --J.,. .. 
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argument is basically the same as Marshall's, yet crucial and 
reachinz implications are made explicit. 
It is important to realize that even if the ERP essentially 
~uropean form, it was conceived as a response to the "chal-ba.d a 
1enge of American f oreir;n policy ... not on the limited basis of 
but on a global basis of every area. "3 This approach to the area, 
needs of the United States directly reflected the major 
of the planning dur.ing the war which have been analysed 
one 
by Gabriel Kolko. The political assumption was that the great capi-
talist states and their dependencies would end the war as powers which 
control and reform; and not that the war had irrevo-
cably weakened the prewar order. 114 Hence, one of the key expressions 
BRP was in Marshall's words: '' .•. the restoration of Europe 
~ --- . . ,, 5 
t:: L:U.ilU1!l,Y • 
even beyond 1914: "It is our hope that ... we wJll be able to get 
d the world back to a multilateral form of trade, pretty much the 
basis of pre-'dorld War I. 116 
Accordance with this thinking was obvious in the planning of 
~H~. It manifested itself most consistently in the concept of 
Trj_angle 'l1rade, in which the function of the European economy 
2After Jones, l"ifteen Weeks, p. 279. 
3 House, Postwar hecoverv, p. 98. 
4Gn.ln·ie1 l:o1ko, The l)olitics of \far, (New York, 1968), p. 265. 
in its international perspective. At the Congressional 
· rings, Dean ~cheson defined this trading system which to 
11ea 
liberal thinking had been basic for domestic prosperity: 
[Before the wai:J Europe's existence depended on triangular or 
quadrangular trade. An unfavorable balance of trade with one 
area, as it is called, was balanced off by a favorable balance 
with other areas ••.• One half of the imports of western Europe 
came from the ~:es tern Hemisphere, but an equivalent amount 
of its products did not come here. Instead large amounts went 
to eastern .Europe and Southeast Asia which sent their prodticts 
to this continent as well as to Europe. In this way these areas 
paid western Europe, which could pay us.7 
For its part, the Ilarriman Report not only ~entioned the para-
mount importance of a prosperous .Europe a~noutlet for a potential 
expansioE of exports when the domestic market had been satisfied 1 
it also stated that "the prosperous conditions in Burope are es-
sential to the maintenance of llmerican trade in other parts of the 
world." 8 Truman had the same idea in mind, when he underlined in 
his Special Net.> sage to vont;re::os, Det.:enLer 19, 194 7, Ll1&L '' .i.D te:r1iiS 
of our own economy, European recovery is essential, 11 and proceeded 
to draw the attention to the trade system which before the war had 
_furnishecl Burope with payments from tht:) surplus of exports of se-
condary products to the prir:mry producing countries. 9 
Neither had the British much Cloubt· about where the means to 
buy the surnlus of imports from the United States had come from in 
the past and was to come from j.n the future. T1ord JCeynes told the 
7. 
House, Por>tl'l<.:lT I:ecov~, p. G97. 
8 IIarri·,..r,,·, l,~)·)n•'.L p 1'3· fc)r a S. l0 fc"il~."·.1° ''t'·ter·ent cee 3enatP 
----'..:.'.'.::..:.:. =-~-_::..;!._.':'.,' • ( ' . d_ • ... iJ cl !l , ' 0 . , , ~ ' 
p. 4l1~). 
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gouse of Lords that it would never be a question of having to pay 
United States by direct exports. Hather the object were to pay 
the 
United States by exporting to any other part of the world, "and the 
it is partly for that very reason that the Americans have felt that 
the multilateral system was the only sound basis for any arrangement 
of this kind. 1110 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, fully 
agreed to this proposition. The future for the British economy lay 
" •.• far afield. In the first place, we turn our eyes to Africa 
and equally to all the overseas terrj_ tories." In the British, the 
Dutch, the :French, the Belgian, and the Portuguese dependencies, the 
sources of a balanced European trade was to be found. "They have 
the raw materials, food, and resources which can be turned into 
gre:::it <!0mmor1 f-1dvantage: hoth to the people of th~ torr:i.tor:i.es them-
selves, and to the world as a whole."J_l 
In addition to the American need for Europe, which on its side 
depended on its territories as earners of dollars, came the direct 
need for raw materials. 12 Clayton often talked about the necessity 
" •.. for all kinds of raw materials to feed our huge productive 
machine. 1113 Secretary Krug from the Interior Department told the 
10 Atter :Jeymour B. Harris, ed., The Hew Economics: KeynQD_' 
.!._nflum1ce on 'l'heorv and Public l)olicv, ( ]~ondon, 1960), p. 394. 
11 House, .I'ostw~:1T Recovery, p. 729. 
]? 
--·nl~li. ,'.'/III, lJo. 1lV1, ,Tune ?.7, 1q,H~, p. ff27. 
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r eign .Affairs Comrni ttee that the critical ma teriaJs could hardly 
.fo · 
be expected to be found in Burope in quantities that could be ex-
, ported. But the .European countries could contribute the equipment 
and know-how "-.- .. and South America and Africa, China, and Inclia 
provide the raw materials. 1114 
After the Second World War, however, nationalistic movements 
throughout the European dependencies had in various degrees gained 
from the weakness of their colonial powers and from the defeat of 
Japan. The question was how fast the political and military vacuum 
left over after the Japanese withdrawal could be fill~d again. The 
·degree to which the traditional American attitude to the European 
·colonies had been reversed by the possibility of acriess to the raw 
materials through the open-door in Europe, was indicated by Assis-
tant Secretary of Commerce, Mr.. Bissel, who stated that the rn8 in 
problem was " ••• when or if those territories will be politically 
~cified, and if so, how soon thereafter they will begin making 
substantial exports of petroleum, tin, rubber, and other materials. 1115 
Thorp, was also uneasy about areas where the native populations were 
on their ·way towards independence, because these countries were 
·often important for the resources of raw· materials·: "The present 
; ~certainties concerning their probable political behavior create 
a risk which f::;tands in the way of immediate investr;1ent and de-
~ ·lelopment. "16 
1,.,t 
~--------t" ~ 14Ho1 1 r;r>' 0 octt r r 1-{ 'CO , ~ ~ ~- .o · dd. _ ~vcrv, p. 54 9. 
. i 
- 59 -
If it can be said that the American policy-makers ignored 
deep-seated poverty in other parts of the world, they obviously 
did not forget the American dependence on primary products from 
these parts of the world. Hence, it seeos a mistake·~ priori to 
exclude such areas from the "peace ancl prosperity" approach to 
1 . · · l? I t d th t b t th world po itics. ns ea , · ere appears o e reason o see e 
Marshall l?lan in a broader context and to extend the description 
of the motivation behind it in order to cover the world-view that 
was reflected in its basic assunptions. Exactly the fact that the 
developing areas Here explicitly included in the EHP policy and 
the role it was planned they carry out, adds important features 
to the understanding of the basic visions behind the EHP. Con-
trary to IJaterson' s suggestion that the peace and prosperity con-
cept was not applied universally or consistently, the evidence seems 
to indicate that the realization of the need for free access to raw 
and strategic materials in a free market-place economy was deeply 
embedded and integrated in ~he approach of the Marshall Plan to the 
crisis in Western Europe. If already the Atlantic Charter had stated 
this need as an absolute precondition t6 economic development and 
peace, the Earslm11 1)l~~n had adopted this baf:dc assunption as a 
Iience, the role of the Third World in the American scheme of 
-
17 
- }~c_r i1-J.'. . ~:,-t~,-r"'",'.~.n-r1,,. :-~ q-r 1 r,.,~TJ"llt r1·r·r1 
. ...... ... .. - .... , - "-' •• :.1.. t' ,• \)_ • \..~ . ( . l \-\. ~ice a1Jov0 p. 40 • 
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·things has to be emphasized as an es~;ential element of the attempt 
to reestablish a pattern of world trade which had been at the 
heart of the pre-depression world order. In this context, a spe-
cial interest must be applied to the role of the Latin American 
economies in this revival and perpetuation of the status quo. For 
several reasons 1 it would be natural to assume that the American 
theories and practices in dealing with the southern part of its 
own heDisphere will indicate uays and means and objectives of the 
American political econor.w. 
First, it was widely acknowledged that, with the exception of 
Argentina, the Latin American republics had loyally and actively 
contributed to the defeat of the Axis powers, had readily geared 
their production to the Allied need for expande~ imports of many 
form of j_nfla ti on because of svrplus exports to the United States 
in order to speed up its war production. Seymour Harris concluded 
in 1944: 
In short, Latin America has provided goods when they were 
scarce, and it looks as though we shall return theo, at least 
in part when they are more plentiful .••. In short~ in exchan~e 
for vitally necessary war oaterials we have provided these 
countries with paper credit, with dollars that are manufacturei 
by our bankin~ system, and with gold for which they have no 
use.18 
A second rea~rnn for cwsuoJ.ng that Latin American econoLlic 
development would receive a benevolent attention in Washin~ton was 
_ the general acceptance of the view that " ... a sound economic de-
---
of 
~ 
f 
" t 
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· yelopment of Latin America is in our own interest •..• We are not 
onlY paying lip service to a popular idea. 1119 It was admitted, 
though, that criticism was often heard and charges were made that 
the United ~.itates does " ... not favor economic development in Latin 
.America since such development would coo.pete with our own produc-
tion.1120 :Out the liberal view, which dominated the State Department 
throughout this period, clearly rejected such cynicism. Clayton 
pointed out that '' ••• we have always had the largest trade with the 
1 d t . "21 highly deve ope coun ries. 
So far the reasoning followed the line of the peace and pros-
. peri ty concept, which Paterson has described, seein,g a "sound 11 eco-
nomic development as a means in itself to bar revolutionary politics 
and to expand American markets through creation of an American 
h-ri YlfJ" 
. -- ---<.....> the peo.c-e 
and prosperity concept beyond the level of rhetoric, are indicated 
in the American definition of a 'sound' econoo.y. This term, some-
t times replaced by "integrated" or 11 collaborated", constituted the ~ . 
t 
[~ 
~:: ~ 
~; 
link bet1·;een an abstract economic theory and concrete business prac-
tice. The connotations of these terms e~plain the obvious difference 
in the way the peace and prosperity concept was applied to different 
: areas. Highlighting ~he geopoli U_cal aspects of a r;table, liberal 
19,.,c''{ 'T1fr-· . ._. 4') 2 ~,Av 1, i~o. 4 c, Dec. 1, 1947, p. 1?15, Horf'.'lan Arf'.'lour, 
Assistant 0eeretary of State. 
21. 
liOUi:.~P, r. 3?tJ· 327. 
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world-order, it reveals some of the basic assumptions of the 
political economy in the literal sense of the word. 
To the American policy-makers the economic cris±s of Latin 
America was fundamentally different from the European. It seemed 
that where Europe was threatened with collapse, the Latin American 
Republics were faced with obstacles to going forward. 2? Truman stated 
at the final session of the Hio Conference that "the problems of 
countries in this Hemisphere are different in nature and cannot 
be relieved by the sane means and by the same approaches which 
are in contemplation for Europe." The United States had to differ-
entiate between the urgent need for rehabilitation of war-shattered 
areas and the problems of development elsewhere. 23 While it was 
acknowledged that some of the Latin American states had balance-
or-payment prooiews, these difficulties were essentially d1f-
ferent from the European shortage, which arose " ... from the neces-
sary heavy importations of food and raw materials ..•• What Latin 
AILerica needs is capital goods." 24 
From this difference in the stage of economic development it 
followed that the need in the other American republics was for 
nlong term economic collaboration." Truman explained that this was 
"the type of collaboration in which a much greater ne~d falls to 
22_ 
0.3., Department of State, Council on Foreien Relations, 
_lli.iited 0tatE?_§. in ~jorld Affairs, 1947-1948, p. 136. 
r· )1'')'c,JJ, xv·-r H 
-.::;:_}. . . v l , i~ 0 • 428, fiept. 14, 194?, p. 498-501. 
2 4 )''. 1·' x. \Tj·~ -~ •. ' ~~' .._v ·-· Iio. 44~~' Dec. 21, l(H7. 
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ivate citizens and groups than is the case in a program designed pr 
a id Europe.
1125 Similarly, Horman Arri.our, Assistant 0ecretary to 
~f state, declared that the problems of Latin America pointed to 
the inportance of creating satisfactory opportunity "for the for-
. as well as dor:lestic investor. 1126 Spruille Braden, also Assis-eJ.gn 
tant Secretary of ~tate, tried to convince the Latin Americans 
that "sound industrialization can, by all odds: be carried out more 
effectively under the dynamic system of private enterprise, to 
l ~ d d . .L d t" i' t b b t 11 28 which we are a  e icaGe , i1an ever can e y governmen . 
The belief in the neceusity of the use of private capital and 
foreign investment was often made clear by references to the North 
American experience during the 19th century. At the Bogota' Confer-
~~e, Marshall invited the other Arwrican renublics to fallow this 
example and try to attract foreign capital to participation in eco-
nomic development. He recalled, thou~h, that European venture ca-
pital was invested. in the United States 11 ••• at first cautiously and. 
often with r:lisunderstanding on both sides. 11 But he emphasize(l that 
"despite the transfor~ation from debtor to creditor .•• the United 
States continues to ~elcome money and technical assistance from 
other couu-tries. n 28 Ji.:pparently the 1Jorth A:~erican hospitality to-
25_)"·-3 x ~ , VI I , .No • 4::? 8 , Sept . 14 , 19 4 7 , p . 4 9 (3 . 
26D"' ~' XVIII, IJo. 4b:), May =~o, 19t18, p. 714. 
y 27 Llo;rcl Hughlett, 
Ork, -.L'_·: ,_·r, E:1· ;' , '1 r, · 
. p. ~1-i) i' • 
ed., Inrlustriali~ation 
r ~ - 64 -, venture capital did not impress the Latin Americans wa.rds foreign 
too much. Former president of Chile, Carlos Davila, said on another 
occasion: "The Good Neighbor policy is also Good Business policy." 
29 
If private enterprise was one aspect of the definition of a 
sound econonic development, another was the expansion of the pro-
duction of primary materials. Armour said that "our government holds 
the view that fuller utilization be r:ade of the resources of the 
underdeveloped coUi.J.tries in such a way that a better balance re-
sults between primary and secondary industries. 1130 The problen from 
the Latin American point of view was how such a balance could be 
achieved by expansion of the production of raw materials, as all 
the countries south of the Rio Grande were badly in need of heavy 
machinery and manufactured goods, while surplus production of raw 
ence after · World War r. 31 Armour solved this problem by ex-
plaining that " .•• careful consideration should be given to the 
imcroveraent and extension of primary industries and to the pro-
portion in which soundly based manufacturing industries should be 
developed." 32 
If World War II had created serious economic problems in La-
29After Samuel Guy Inman, "Some latin AYlerican Views on Post-
war Hcco11i::>truction," Forei.gn Affairs Her>ort, XX, March 15, 1944, p. 6. 
Ho. 442, Dec. 21, 1947, p. 1215. 
31 . 
· counc1l on Foreign Helations, lJJii.~cl ~)tat es in Uorln Affairs 
1947-/'.h , ]'L.)J ~-::...' l·" --~ -· 
' 
J'. V I I , l~ o . 4 4 2 1 J)ec. 21,:1947, p. 12J5. 
___________________ ........._,,"" .. ' 
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tin America, it had also offered an unprecedented chance. Being cut 
off from some of its traditional suppliers of manufactured goods, 
a.rid with the United States preoccupied with war production, it had 
been possible for "baby-industries" to develop and fill U}) parts 
of the economic vacuum. 33 Hence, after the war, the natural tenNency 
a.mong Latin American states had been to try to resort to protective 
tariffs to preserve these industries. 34 The capital equipment, how-
ever, had been overextended in order to meet both local and Allied 
demands, and new capital goods were much needed to encounter the 
revival of foreign competition. For this reason, and because of 
the want of a balanced trade to halt the inflation, the problem of 
a dollar shortage was rising, while considerable amounts were frozen 
in sterling, except for a short period of sterling-dollar converti-
This was the situation when South America was called upon to 
help fulfill the needs of western Europe through the allocations 
of the Marshall Plan. As Truman put it:' 
The European Recovery 1?rogram will require procure:oent of sup-
plies in many nations of this Her;1isphere. This will act as a 
stimulant to production and busineps activity and promote the 
re-establishment of world trade upon which the prosperity of 
us all depend.36 
The La tin American republics, however, dj_d not remember the 
-----.. -.. _.. 
in World Af_fairn, 1947-48, p. 128. 
341''oreiim Affairs He port, XX, p. 6. 
'Z C:: 
_}ju- ,, 
' • k) .. 
XVIII, No. 449, Feb. 8, '1948, p. 18?. 
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. golden days of the pre-depression trade pattern the same way State 
Department did. Neither did th~y want back the semi-colonial status, 
still in recent memory, nor did they wish to expand-production of 
ra.W materials beyond what normal conditions in foreign markets 
37 
could hold. 
The Americans saw things differently. Pushing for a return to 
the Triangle pattern, State Department officials repeated at the 
Inter-American conferences over and over that the ERP would restore 
the buying power of former customers in Europe. "It is safe to say 
·that, without the restoration of these former markets, there can be 
no permanent solution to the economic diffic~lties which now beset 
the American republics. 11 38 
Hence, it was considered in the Latin American self-interest 
to support the Marshall Plan. Marshall hioself saw the EHP as a 
"prerequisi te 11 to Latin American development and he stated in 
Bogota: "All that are able should contribute, all will share the 
7Q benefits. 1177 Geymour Harris, however, concluded that che non-EHP 
countries 1vould face hard times. With exports up and imports down, 
. . 40 lnfl>1 +_._; 01"',·~"r. ',.r pre>-·sure~', 'TO'Jld i' ncreac p <'1.lr rpl ,- On the quec+ l0 011 ~ v c  _; _ ,, - W , _ " o ~ ._, l a. _ -,Y • . , • u '-'
of contriJ:mtion, EJrris coucluded: 
",focrca:'3 the BH? goods to be nrovided bv the U.S. ( excess of ex-port~:; over imports) i.s to be about l lf) percent of the income 
of th::Ls country, the burden on t.i'lc~ economy of the other il.neri-
37 ~u' r) "n '.,re J··ld ' f .f',1~ .... , --~-·-..L- !!_l_-·_'- ~~!.-~' 1947-41:~, p. 135. 
XVII, No. 44?, Dec. 21, 1947, p. 12ll). 
XVIII, J;o. 4~7, April.11, 1948, p. 469. 
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(• 
cas is to be about 8 to 9 percent of their income, or about 6 
to 7 times as much as for the United States •.•• In other words, 
they are being asked to provide goods under the ERP in exchange 
for credits or dollars; and the ·use of these dollars is to be 
subject to control by the United States.41 
According to contemporary evidence both from those who actively 
participated in the planning and execution of the ERP, as from econ-
omic commentators, the Latin American republics we·re very much in-
volved in the Marshall Plan, as they were assie;ned the role of con-
tributors. The embrace of Latin America by the peace and prosperity 
concept appeared to add a petspective to the Marshall Plan which re-
veals some of the basic premises of the program. 
During the suIIlI2er and fall of 1947, the broader implications 
of the Marshall Plan were formulated. The opening of the imperial 
syster;is in Europe r:-iade it possible for American political economy 
to formulate some of the basic atrategies for a new world-order. 
An important assumption was the balance between the primary and the 
secondary producing countries - a balance which was supposed to be 
sustained by the authority of the United States. Although the Marshall 
Plan seemed to concentrate on the European balance-of-power, it 
aimed towards the establishment of an economic world-order that 
. 
would be congenial to the political and economic institutions of the ~· 
~~~ 
~ United States. ~f 
~· 
~· 
~· 
.. 
p. l(J-18. 
r. 
. ... 
r 
~ ,,. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the basic assunptions that shaped the policy 
of the Ma~shall Plan, as revealed in the contemporary context, seem 
to offer evidenc·e for the Williams-interpretation of the continuity 
and coherence of the long-run objectives sought by the foreign policy 
of the United States~ The objectives behind the Marshall Plan were 
modeled upon the traditional search fo:!.'.' expanding ma:!.'.'l~~t::.: - a noec 
that seemed all the more urgent as the war had expanded American 
productivity so tremendously. While the domestic market was consid-
dered adequate to absorb the output in the short-run, the Truman 
administration felt compelled to engage in thLs project which from 
an economic point bf view was expected botn to furnish ample mar-
kets in Europe and secure.access to cheap raw materials elsewhere. 
Given the conventional explanation for the economic difficul-
ties in the thirties, the weakness of Europe in 1947 seemed to of-
fer a chance for revision of the trend towards state trading that 
could be expected. It was openly adm.itted that" .•• if a proposal 
somewhat.along the lines of HRP is not adopted we will see an em-
1 phasizing of state-controlled econor:iies all over Europe." Denying 
r ·- 69 -
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·that capi;talism was able to survive in one country alone, the ad-
~inistration took up the imperial definition of the needs for a 
preservation of the n~tional integrity, extended this nefinition 
to Europe, and connected it with the physical security interests 
which had been confirmed with the military engagement during the 
world War. 
From an economic point of view, the ERP was expected to 
strengthen the European cormni tment to the kind of manipulated mar-
ket-pldce economy that seemed to be able to stabilize the economic 
development in advanced industrial states. Using its economic power 
to try to achieve a high degree of integration among the capitalist 
industrial countries, the United States acknowledged through the 
~rshall Plan that these nations shared interests both in confron-
tation with the Soviet Union and in the antagonism with the devel-
oping countries. 
Perhaps it is absurd to try to establish a list of priorities 
among the different aspects of the motivation behin~ the Marshall 
Plan, because some people stressed military, while others stressed 
humanitari::~n or economic aspects. "The pian offered all things to 
all people;. "2 It seems nevertheless jm>tified to say that the eco-
nomic ob.iectives as they were conceived by the administratj_on and 
framed by familiar and accepted ass1mptions of the ideology of 
.politic al. economy, were compelling in thernsel ves - given the con-
----
1 Hou.Je, })ost\12r ~~;_goverv, p. 335 . 
.... _________________________________ .,,,.,,,,·c·· 
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cept of the needs of the .American political and economic system. 
If these needs were often stated in economic terms, they had broader 
implications, backed by a general consensus on the socio-economic 
J 
institutions of the United States. Although Marshall had once ex-
plained that he was not a businessman, he often resorted to business 
terms when he explained the means and ends of foreign policy, such 
as his summary of the basic assumptions behind the plan: 
The ERP is a mobilization for peace, meeting the challenge of 
an alien system by strengthening the hands of those nations 
that believe as we do .••. We in the United States, perhaps 
more than any other part of the world, believe in private en-
tc~rprise. We are convinced that trade within our country and 
between our country and other nations can best be so conducted. 
And we further believe in equality of opportunity. As stated 
in the Atlantic Charter, every country should have equal access 
to the trade and raw materials of the world •.•. We have taken 
leadership in the world in every effort to keep the~way open for 
free enterprise.3 
on the euonomic aspect or 
petuate a pro-American world-order, the theme of United States for-
eign policy in the post-war era can hardly be stated more concisely. 
Paterson has definitely found a very precise name for the 
thrust of American policy in the period of the Marshall Plan, and 
his analysis embraces significant eleraents of the American motiva-
tion for the lm_r. However, his conception for ideo1oey appears to 
be too narrow. As it seems, Paterson .i~plicitly makes a distinction 
between uhat American policy-ma.kers thought they were do~ng and 
lhat they actually did, a distinction between rhetoric and practice, 
----
·.c 
JNarsho.11 before ~)ubcommi ttee on Tariff and Heciprocal '1'rade 
~f~the House 1/lays arnl Vica.ns Committee, May 6, 1948, printed :i.n rn;m, 
V1rr, hay 16, 1948, p. 6~1-652. 
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between idealistic thinking and harsh political realities, ideology 
l 
and action. 
But the ideology of political economy behind the Marshall Plan 
was not just a few simplistic principles of theblessing and neces-
sitY of multilateral trade and of stopping Communistic advance by 
prosperity. Rather, it was a coherent bloc of theory and practice 
which manifested itself in the concept of revitalizing a stable 
world order in which the relationship between primary and secondary 
producers could be secured in a way that appeared congenial to the 
socio-economic interests of the dominant strata and ~lasses in a 
corporate capitalistic state. The argument of Paterson rests~ in the 
J 
last analysis, 011 the idea of ideology as something separate form 
its economic basis. Hence, he is able to point to hypocritical ele-
men.ts in the application of the peace 
ferent parts of the world (the disregard for prospective customers 
in the developin~ countries and the non-liberal parts of the trade 
policy) . Seen from such an angle, the American ideology rer:mins a 
rhetorical varnish - a characteristic it would indeed share with all 
theoretical formations of political thinking. Such an approach to 
history tends to promote a schizophrenic conception of historical 
forces. 
Any reasonable understanding of the roots of forei~n policy 
r.mst base its analysic on a clear cnnception of the relationship 
between cconoffiic basis and superstructure, theory and practice. 
Eugene Gcno\roue has clarified this question by a reference to the 
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The analysis ••• ·reinforces the notion of·an "historical bloc" 
in which the material forces are the content1 and ideologies 
the form - merely an analytical distinction since material 
forces would be historically inconceivable without form and 
since ideologies would have to be considered individual bab-
bling without material forces.4 
A class conscious interpretation of American foreign policy, 
following these lines, will consider the formulation and conduct 
of foreign affairs uithin the frame of elaborate structures of theo-
ry and practice, " ••• ~ermeating the consciousness of entire epochs, 
••• and so closely related to the dominant structures of produc-
tion that the relationship is no longer a matter for conscious re-
flect ion." 5 
Hence, the important thing about the Marshall Plan is not so 
much that some businessmen and some State Department officials of 
policy-makers said something and did something else. Neither is it 
overall important that different economic groups, located on dif-
ferent stages of production or geographically separated, competed 
among themselves for direct influence in the decision-making pro-
cess, "s.uperficially appearing as interest groups rather than as a 
unified class." The important fact (with consequences for the un-
derstanding of the past as for the prese·nt) is: 
••• fWl hat kind of socioeconomic. framework they all wish to 
compete within, and the relationship between themselves and 
the rest of society in a manner that defines their vital func-
tion as a class •••• That they disagree on the options is less 
4Eugene Genovese, "Marxian Interpretations of the Slave South"," 
in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Towards !! .New Past:: .Dissenting Essa vs 
1:g American History, (New York, 1969), p. 98. 
5Chis'topher Lasch, The Agony of the Af.lerican kf.!., (New York, 
1966) , p. 8. . . 
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consequential than that they circumscribe the political uni-
verse.6 
This paper has argued. that the econor:iic situation in the United 
States offered other possibilities in the spring of 1947, than those 
described by 1·iilliams, - prospects which can be clarified by a dis-
tinction between short and long term considerations of the objectives 
of the foreign policy. Furthermore, it seems that the administration 
should not be mistaken for groups, who feared an imminent recession. 
However, these poin"Gs of view have been established in order to con-
firm and attempt to de~elop the view that American diplomacy, 
through the policy of the Harshall Plan, reflected the demands of 
a corporate capitalistic system, confronted with econoBic and social 
challenges at home and abroad. 
the pluralistic pattern of business interests but from the way these 
interests have been able to dominate the definition of the American 
destiny. 
Niels Thorsen 
6 Kolko, Eootf>, p. G. 
----------------------------------"""'· ·•<-·•·,.~ , .... 
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